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An unexpected drop in U.S. electricity consumption has utility companies worried that
the trend isn't a byproduct of the economic downturn and could reflect a permanent shift
in consumption that will require sweeping change in their industry.
-Rebecca

Smith, Wall Street Journal1

Good for you, bad for us.
-Electric

Utility Official

2

INTRODUCTION

Energy policy debates often focus on increasing the supply of
renewable energy, but energy demand merits equal attention. Lowcarbon energy sources will not be able to displace fossil fuels at the
levels necessary to achieve climate goals if global demand continues to
grow at projected rates. 3 To meet the widely endorsed goal of 50%
global carbon emissions reductions by 2050, including 80% reductions
from developed countries, global emissions from fossil fuel use will
need to decline by more than seven billion tons from projected levels
by 2050. 4 Major new sources of low-carbon energy will become
available, but it is unrealistic to assume that new low-carbon sources
will expand quickly enough to displace existing fossil fuel sources if

1.
Rebecca Smith, Surprise Drop in Power Use Delivers Jolt to Utilities, WALL. ST. J., Nov.
21, 2008, at Bi.
2.
The electric utility official made this comment at a recent installation of a household
solar photovoltaic system. Email from Linda Breggin, Senior Att'y & Dir., Nanotechnology
Program, Envtl. Law Inst., to Michael Vandenbergh (on file with author) (quoting the utility
official). Although this example involves household energy supply, not demand, a utility's
gatekeeping role and incentives regarding household solar programs are often similar to those
regarding household energy efficiency and conservation programs.
3.
Nathan S. Lewis & David G. Nocera, Powering the Planet: Chemical Challenges in
Solar Energy Utilization, 103 PROC. NAT'L. ACAD. SCI. 15729, 15730 (2006); Nathan S. Lewis,
Powering the Planet, ENGINEERING & SCI., No. 2, 2007, at 12, 16, available at
http://www.ccser.caltech.edu/outreach/powering.pdf. By low-carbon, we mean sources that
generate little or no carbon emissions (e.g., solar, wind, and nuclear energy) or that capture and
store the emissions (e.g., fossil fuel plants with effective carbon capture and storage). We use the
term "carbon" as shorthand for the six greenhouse gases included in the Framework Convention
on Climate Change ("FCCC") and typically expressed as carbon dioxide equivalents ("CO2e"). See
Fact Sheet: The Need for Mitigation, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE (November 2009), http://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/press
_factsh.mitigation.pdf. Our focus here is on energy demand, and we do not take a position on the
optimal mix of energy sources.
4.
See, e.g., S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for
the Next Fifty Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968, 968 (2004) (identifying
strategies that would enable emissions to '"eheld near the present level of seven billion tons per
year (GtC/year) for the next fifty years, even though they are currently on course to more than
double" by 2054).
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global demand doubles as projected.5 In fact, although the percentage
of global electricity generation from fossil fuels has decreased in recent
years, the total amount of fossil fuels consumed has increased. 6 The
same analysis holds true for energy supply and demand in the United
States: the supply of low-carbon energy is projected to grow, but
without a substantial reduction from projected levels of demand, it is
difficult to imagine how low-carbon sources can supply enough energy
to enable the United States to achieve its share of global carbon
7
emissions reductions.
Recognition of the need to reduce energy demand has spawned
a vast literature on energy policy measures that will increase
efficiency and conservation at the industrial, commercial, and
household levels.8 Although the precise magnitude of the opportunity
is the subject of debate, the literature has identified large, low-cost
opportunities to reduce energy use and carbon emissions from these
sectors. 9 For example, recent research in the social and behavioral
sciences suggests that the use of information and other nonintrusive
interventions could achieve a "behavioral wedge" of carbon emissions
reductions at the household level. 10 Behavioral wedge strategies

5.
Lewis, supra note 3, at 12, 16.
6.
INT'L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 2010 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5, 9
(2010).
7.
See discussion infra Part II.A (highlighting the projected increase in energy use in the
United States in the coming decades).
8.
See, e.g., DAN YORK ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON., THREE
DECADES AND COUNTING: A HISTORICAL REVIEW AND CURRENT ASSESSMENT OF ELECTRIC

UTILITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY ACTIVITY IN THE STATES 1 (2012); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne
C. Steinemann, The Carbon-NeutralIndividual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1675 (2007) (discussing
household energy efficiency and carbon emissions reductions); see also John Dernbach,
Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption: Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency
and Conservation, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10003, 10003 (2007); Noah Sachs, Greening Demand:
Energy Consumption and U.S. ClimatePolicy, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 295, 298 (2009).
9.
See, e.g., HANNAH CHOI GRANADE ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., UNLOCKING ENERGY
EFFICIENCY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 4 (2009), availableat http://www.mckinsey.com/client-service/
electricpower andnatural gasflatestthinking/
unlocking-energy..efficiencyin_theuseconomy (concluding based on an engineering study that
large increases in efficiency can be achieved in the United States at a net negative cost). But see
Hunt Alcott & Michael Greenstone, Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap? 3-4 (Energy Inst. at
Haas, Working Paper No. 228, 2012), availableat http://ei.haas.berkeley.edu/pdf/working-papers
/WP228.pdf (arguing based on economic theory that the efficiency gap is smaller than claimed by
engineers); MALCOLM KEAY, OXFORD INST. FOR ENERGY STUDIES, ENERGY EFFICIENCY-SHOULD
WE TAKE IT SERIOUSLY? 20 (2011) (same).
10. See Thomas Dietz et al., Household Actions Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly
Reduce U.S. Carbon Emissions, 106 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 18452, 18452 (2009) (describing
"behaviorally oriented policies and interventions" as a potential behavioral wedge). The wedge
concept was introduced in Pacala & Socolow, supra note 4, at 968-69. See also JASON CZARNESKI,
EVERYDAY ENVIRONMENTALISM: LAW, NATURE AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR 1-4 (2011); Dernbach,
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reduce carbon emissions by reducing household energy demand
through improved efficiency (e.g., purchase of less energy-intensive
appliances) and conservation (e.g., reduced use of existing
appliances). 1 Any one strategy could have a small effect on its own,
but aggregate behavioral efforts have the potential to produce
reasonably achievable reductions in total U.S. emissions of 7% by
2020. This amount exceeds the total emissions of many major
industrial sectors and is larger than all of the emissions from
France.12
Notable reductions in the growth of household energy use have
occurred in recent years, 13 but the United States is not on track to
achieve a behavioral wedge. 14 Although many scholars have
emphasized demand reduction as an important area for new legal and
policy tools, 1 5 few have focused on the institutional barriers to its
achievement. 16 In this Article, we identify the incentives of electric
distribution utilities as a frequently overlooked barrier to achieving
household energy demand reductions in the United States, examine
the conceptual obstacles to overcoming this barrier, and explore a
range of potential responses. 17 Although we focus on U.S. household
supra note 8, at 10003; Katrina F. Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual
Behaviors That Harm the Environment, 61 DUKE L.J. 1111, 1112 (2012).
11. Although improved efficiency and conservation are distinct mechanisms for achieving
demand reduction, many commentators treat them together as 'low-hanging fruit" among
possible behavioral wedge measures. Michael P. Vandenbergh, Jack Barkenbus & Jonathan
Gilligan, Climate Change: The Low-Hanging Fruit, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1705-06 (2008).
12. Id. at 1731. For a discussion of the importance of the cumulative effects of multiple
small reductions in energy use and carbon emissions, see Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities
and PolycentricInstitutions:Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking
Actions at Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353, 356-57 (2012).
13.

ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ANNUAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2012 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2035, at

85-86 (2012) (discussing how increasing efficiency has led to slowing demand growth for
electricity since 1950).
14.
See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S. CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS AND INTENSITIES
OVER TIME: A DETAILED ACCOUNTING OF INDUSTRIES, GOVERNMENT, AND HOUSEHOLDS 16-18

(2010) (predicting improvement in household emissions efficiency for the 2006 to 2010 period);
Smith, supra note 1, at B1.
15. E.g., Dernbach, supra note 8, at 10003; Sachs, supra note 8, at 295; Vandenbergh &
Steinemann, supra note 8, at 1675.
16. See, e.g., Paul C. Stern et al., Design Principles for Carbon Emissions Reduction
Programs, 44 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 4847, 4847 (2010) (noting the importance of institutional
barriers); Jiyong Eom & James L. Sweeney, Shareholder Incentives for Utility-Delivered Energy
Efficiency Programs in California 2-3 (May 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, Precourt Energy
Efficiency Ctr., Stanford Univ., 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=1401529.
17. We focus on the demand for electricity in the United States at the household or
residential level, but our analysis is also relevant to other energy users (e.g., small businesses)
and to other energy sources (e.g., natural gas). See discussion infra Part II.A; see also Daniel A.
Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and Other Dispersed Sources, 35 ENVTL. L. REP.
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demand, global household demand is projected to increase
dramatically over the next several decades, and utilities' incentives to
18
reduce household demand are important at the global level as well.
The incentives of retail electric distribution utilities are
essential because these utilities are critical gatekeepers for household
demand reduction programs. This is an important but easily
overlooked point. Retail electric distributors, both public and private,
interact regularly with consumers, and they control much of the flow
of information to and from households and the access to opportunities
for demand reduction. They can act aggressively to induce widespread
adoption of new practices and more efficient equipment. Or they can
conduct widely publicized programs that comply with applicable
mandates and generate goodwill without actually generating major
reductions in demand. In addition, by controlling access to information
and connection with the grid, they can encourage or discourage other
firms from selling goods and services that may reduce household
demand. 19 All of this can occur with little transparency to regulators
and the public.
Despite the gatekeeping role of electric distribution utilities
and the importance of reducing household energy demand,
distributors in most jurisdictions do not have incentives to ensure that
demand reduction strategies succeed on a wide scale. 20 In fact, under
the regulatory regimes in most states, utilities would suffer revenue
erosion if they induced substantial reductions in demand. Instead, the
rate structure in most jurisdictions creates incentives for utilities to
promote demand growth. If an essential gatekeeper has financial
incentives to increase aggregate demand, it should not be surprising
that large-scale demand reduction is not occurring.

10745, 10745 (2005) (noting the importance of behavioral interventions for small businesses).
Reductions in U.S. energy demand from projected levels are necessary whether nuclear power or
coal with capture and storage are part of the energy supply mix.
18. For example, China is expected to add as many new households between 2005 and 2030
as existed in the Western Hemisphere in 2000. Jianguo Liu & Jared Diamond, China's
Environment in a Globalizing World, 435 NATURE 1179, 1184 (2005), available at
http://archive.csis.msu.edu/Publications/JLiu_2005-Nature.pdfhttp://archive.csis.msu.eduPublic
ations/JLiu_2005_Nature.pdf. A recent study suggests that fifty million new household air
conditioning units were added in China in 2010 alone. See Stan Cox, Cooling a Warming Planet:
A Global Air Conditioning Surge, YALE ENV'T 360 (July 10, 2012), http://e360.yale.edu/feature
/cooling-a-warming-planeta-global airconditioningsurge/2550/.
19. For example, Carbon Salon, through online carbon emissions tracking, has provided
individuals with carbon reduction strategies and data if the local utility allows disclosure of
electric bills. CARBON SALON, http://www.carbonsalon.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
20. See discussion infra Part I1 (noting the lack of incentives for utilities to achieve an
NDR).
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Two conceptual barriers undermine efforts to create incentives
for electric distribution utilities to sell less of their product. The first is
the use of policy efforts known as "demand-side management"
("DSM"), which we discuss in Part II. On the surface, DSM appears to
address all forms of demand management, including demand
reduction, but DSM efforts have focused on shifting the timing of
demand, not on reducing the total amount of demand. DSM efforts
typically involve reducing electricity generation costs by shifting
demand from peak to off-peak periods. This shift allows utilities to
fully deploy their lowest-cost sources of electric power, while underdeploying or under-investing in higher-cost sources, including
renewable energy. For example, in areas where air conditioning is a
large component of total electricity use, peak summer use occurs
during the late afternoon and early evening. Utilities have generating
units standing by to provide the additional electricity necessary at
peak times. These "peaker" units are often natural gas turbines that
are more expensive to operate than the coal-fired units that supply
base load electricity for about half of the country.
If the costs of operation captured all of the important
considerations, this approach to demand would not be problematic.
But the social costs of carbon are externalized, and coal-fired units
generate roughly twice the carbon emissions of natural gas units. As a
result, in many areas, DSM programs that shift electricity use to offpeak periods may increase total carbon emissions from electricity
generation. 21 DSM efforts thus may be working at cross-purposes with
efforts to reduce carbon emissions. With increasing concerns about the
carbon emissions of electricity generation, policymakers have begun to
emphasize demand response options, renewable or clean power
standards, and other measures. DSM programs may undermine these
efforts, however, by increasing carbon emissions in those areas
dependent on high-carbon base load units. DSM thus has facilitated a
subtle shift in energy debates and policies from how much electricity
is used to when it is used, yet DSM can actually increase carbon
emissions by increasing overall electricity use and by shifting the mix
of base load and peak generation sources.
To address the conceptual confusion caused by the use of the
term DSM, in this Article we advance "net demand reduction" ("NDR")
as an important, but oft-overlooked, concept. By NDR, we mean
21.
As used in this Article, "base load" refers to the minimum amount of power that a
utility must make available to meet its customer demand by providing reliable electricity during
"peak" periods. Base load plants are plants that are dedicated to the production of base load
power supply. Such plants typically are characterized by efficiencies that favor operating at or
near capacity and very stable and predictable fuel availability and operational characteristics.
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reductions in the total demand for energy, including electricity. Part II
defines the problem by examining how carbon constraints affect
projected energy supply and demand, and by highlighting the
potential carbon emission reductions from NDR. It shows how wellentrenched policy instruments such as DSM mask NDR's benefits by
assuming a demand curve that is largely fixed. This conventional
approach to demand reinforces the strategic business purposes of a
utility, whose regulatory incentives lead it to view NDR as revenue
erosion. We argue that the conventional approach is not likely to yield
long-term energy demand at levels that can be satisfied by low-carbon
energy sources.
Part II also demonstrates how utilities' financial incentives,
reinforced by state regulators, sustain this NDR blind spot, despite
many laudatory federal goals. In theory, DSM and NDR are fully
compatible, or at least are not inconsistent. Any effort to manage
demand, however, should include careful attention to total energy
demand-not merely to the timing of demand or industry efforts to
expand total customer usage. This is consistent with many of the
stated goals of DSM, and perhaps even with its conservation roots as
endorsed in statutes such as Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
("PURPA"). 22 However, given the financial incentives faced by firms,
as reinforced by the treatment of price and risk in the regulatory
process, DSM has failed to meet its promises. For utilities in many
jurisdictions, efficiency and conservation promotion make good
business sense to a point, especially where firms are guaranteed
compensation for investing in these efforts, but aggressive
implementation of sophisticated NDR efforts could lead to revenue
erosion and financial hardship. 23 The incentive to shift energy usage
from peak to off-peak periods but not to achieve NDR affects a wide
range of household efficiency and conservation programs on the
ground, including the design and implementation of smart meter
24
programs, electric car recharging programs, and others.
A second conceptual barrier makes shifting the regulatory
regime for utilities particularly difficult. For almost a century, the
principal focus of energy regulation has been to keep per-unit rates for
consumers as low as possible. The goal under the dominant approach
22.

Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978).

23.

See AM.

PUB. POWER ASS'N, THE EFFECT OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS

ON

ELECTRIC UTILITY REVENUE REQUIREMENTS 1-2 (2010), available at http://appanet.cmsplus.com/files//PDFs/EffectofEnergyEfficiency.pdf.
24. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95 MINN. L. REV. 715, 766-73 (2011) (discussing electric car
recharging).
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has been to ensure efficient supply in the face of a limited monopoly
for electricity distribution and, to an extent, generation. This goal
assumes that market prices are the best indicator of the true costs of
production. Under this approach, externalities are largely ignored,
and policymakers instead focus on various ways that competition can
yield lower-cost supplies of energy through innovations such as
wheeling power, deregulation, and unbundling generation from
distribution. 25 We demonstrate, however, that although pursuing low
rates is politically convenient for regulators, utilities, and consumer
advocates, it is acceptable to utilities for precisely the reason that it is
often not in consumers' long-term interest: by discouraging efficiency
and conservation and encouraging additional energy use, it leads to
overall demand increases that yield higher total energy costs to the
consumer. If a low-rate approach did not achieve this outcome, in most
areas of the country, utilities would suffer revenue erosion and would
have strong incentives to oppose the low-rate approach. Instead,
emphasizing low rates allows each participant in regulatory debates to
take a popular position, but at the cost of ever-increasing energy use
and total energy costs.
In Part III, we argue that large-scale NDR will not occur
without specific policy instruments that address the financial
incentives of electric distribution utilities. We evaluate how those
incentives must change to produce effective demand reduction policies.
We then survey how options such as carbon pricing, performance
mandates, and decoupling might be used to advance NDR. Ultimately,
we conclude that widespread demand reduction is not likely to occur
until utilities shift from viewing NDR as revenue erosion to viewing it
as a financial opportunity. Achieving this shift will require a more
aggressive commitment by utilities, regulators, and consumer groups
to a different business model-one that treats prices and risks in a
26
fundamentally different manner from traditional ratemaking.
Part IV concludes. We note that our goal in this Article is not to
explore the specific options necessary to achieve NDR but rather to
emphasize the importance of NDR and the conceptual barriers that
25. For a discussion describing how deregulation has made it more difficult to get an
accurate price signal given the externalities, see, for example, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas
Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 90-99 (1982) (discussing the likely
inefficiencies in natural gas markets resulting from deregulation in 1978).
26. See Ronald Brownstein, The CaliforniaExperiment, THE ATLANTIC, Oct. 2009, at 66, 70
(quoting Peter Darbee, Pacific Gas and Electric's Chief Executive Officer, for the proposition that
customers sometimes tell him that "you would love us" because they are using large amounts of
power, but, due to California's decoupled rates, he responds, 'Well, actually I'd prefer that you
use a lot less .... We actually make more money if we sell you less power, and we make less if we
sell you more power.").
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must be overcome to achieve it. Moving forward, reducing net demand
is an important goal alongside increasing the efficiency of supply.
Regardless of the precise regulatory instrument selected, achieving
NDR will require laws and policies that create incentives for
electricity distributors to implement demand reduction programs with
the same vigor as they implement programs to sell power. Pricing
carbon could shift utilities' incentives, but the adoption and
implementation of laws requiring electricity prices to reflect the social
cost of carbon will not occur for some time. Direct regulatory
commands to adopt programs or spend specific amounts will have
some effect, but these efforts will not be implemented as a strategic
priority and may fail for many nontransparent reasons. Major
reductions in demand, in contrast, will require the creation of ongoing,
genuine incentives for utilities to sell less of their product.
II. UTILITY INCENTIVES
We begin by briefly examining why NDR is an important social
goal and by addressing the conceptual and practical barriers to
achieving NDR. Policies and programs that achieve NDR decrease the
need for power supply and thus can directly reduce carbon emissions.
Equally important, NDR reduces the need for power supply
infrastructure, 27 thus creating system-side benefits that can improve
the viability of renewable power supply options. Yet the predominant
industry initiatives and policy instruments aimed at addressing
demand assume that energy usage levels will grow. These efforts view
total customer demand as largely fixed, focusing on exploiting
differences in demand across time or fuel types. Despite laudatory
federal efforts beginning in the 1970s to make efficiency and
conservation the thrust of a nationwide demand response initiative,
demand regulation has deviated from a demand reduction path. The
financial incentives of both utility firms and customers, along with the
approach of state public utility laws, create an NDR blind spot in U.S.
energy policy.
A. The Carbon Reduction Benefits of NDR
A starting point for our analysis is the widely held view that
substantial reductions in carbon emissions from the domestic and
global energy sectors will be a necessary part of any successful climate

27. Such infrastructure includes base load power generation facilities,
transmission and distribution facilities built to serve peak demand.

as well as

1536

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:6:1527

change mitigation effort. 28 Global carbon emissions are projected to
double by 2050.29 To reduce the likelihood that global average
temperature increases will exceed two degrees Celsius, however,
global emissions will need to be reduced by 50% or more. 30 For
developed countries, the common target is 80% to account for greater
contributions to existing carbon stocks and ability to pay for
3
reductions. '
Despite the need for 50 to 80% emissions reductions by 2050,
the business-as-usual projection of the U.S. Energy Information
Administration ("EIA") suggests that electricity use in the United
States will increase by 45% by 2030 (the EIA does not publish
projections for 2050).32 Global electricity use is projected to increase by
over 300% by 2030.33 Increases in energy demand at these levels will
make it very difficult to reduce overall carbon emissions from the
energy sector. Even if new sources of low-carbon energy are brought
online at extraordinary rates, these new sources will be necessary just
to meet the increases in projected demand, and it will be very difficult
34
to replace existing fossil fuel-based sources with low-carbon sources.
28. To reduce the risk of catastrophic climate change, a consensus has emerged that
temperature increases should not exceed two degrees Celsius over pre-industrial levels, and that
to reduce the risk of exceeding two degrees Celsius, atmospheric concentrations should not
exceed 550 ppm of CO2e. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, SUMMARY FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2007). The views of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC")
represent mainstream thought among climate scientists. See William R. L. Anderegg et al.,
Expert Credibility in Climate Change, 107 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 12107, 12107 (2010); Naomi
Oreskes, Behind the Ivory Tower: The Scientific Consensus on Climate Change, 306 SCIENCE
1686, 1686 (2004). A growing literature suggests that there is a substantial risk of reaching a
climate tipping point even if CO2e levels do not exceed 550 ppm. See, e.g., Michael Vandenbergh
& Jonathan Gilligan, Macro Risks: The Challenge for RationalRisk Regulation, 21 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 401, 403 n.8 (2011) (reviewing tail risk literature).
29. See Pacala & Socolow, supra note 4, at 968-69 (describing 2050 emissions projections
and targets "likely to occur in the absence of a focus on carbon").
30. See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 28, at 16 fig.2
(providing chart of temperature targets and atmospheric concentrations); see also UNITED
NATIONS DEV. PROGRAM, U.N. HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE
CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A DIVIDED WORLD 26, 46 (2007), available at http://hdr.undp.org
/enmedialHDR_20072008_EN Complete.pdf.
31.
See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REPORT OF THE
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES 6 (2009), available at http://unfccc.intJresource/docs/2009/copl5
/eng/11a01.pdf (setting forth specific targets for various countries); see also American Clean
Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to statutorily mandate
specific emissions cuts in coming years); U.S. CLIMATE ACTION P'SHIP, A CALL FOR ACTION 7
(2007), available at http://us-cap.orgUSCAPCallForAction.pdf.
32. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INTERNATIONAL ENERGY OUTLOOK 2011, at tbl.D3 (2011)
(providing projections on "total world energy consumption by end-use sector and fuel").
33. Id. at tbl.D1.
34. See id. at 86 (demonstrating a projected increase in utilization for various types of
energy). Under a business-as-usual scenario regarding energy use, we will need ten terawatts
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In short, meeting widespread carbon targets will be difficult
major reductions from projected levels of demand, but it will
with
even
be almost impossible without them.3 5 Although remarkable advances
in low-carbon technologies are likely over the coming decades, 36 there
is some maximum amount of renewable or low-carbon energy that can
reasonably be expected to be produced in any given year or over this
period as a whole. 37 In the absence of near-miraculous new
technologies or major efficiency gains, high carbon-emitting sources
will step in to fill the gap.
Extraordinary efforts will be required to achieve even modest
annual reductions in net energy demand. Professor Nathan Lewis has
examined the role of energy supply and demand in light of the need for
climate change mitigation, and his analysis provides a good example
of the extent of the demand reductions necessary by 2050 if low-carbon
sources are to displace fossil fuels, not just meet new demand. His
business-as-usual scenario assumes that the ratio of energy
consumption to GDP, which has been declining at about 1% per year,

(i.e., ten trillion watts) of carbon-free power. Lewis, supra note 3, at 17. Current global energy
use is now roughly thirteen terawatts. Nathan S. Lewis, Poweringthe Planet, 32 MRS BULL. 808,
808-09 (2007), available at http://authors.library.caltech.edu/9302/1/LEWmrsbO7.pdf. More than
80% of that energy demand is supplied by fossil fuels, which contribute roughly two-thirds of
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, even with a 1% efficiency gain per year
assumption, carbon-free sources will need to supply fifteen to twenty terawatts of energy by
2050. These types of efficiency gains and deployment of carbon-free sources must continue for the
foreseeable future after 2050, leading to a carbon-free supply of almost all energy by 2100. Lewis,
supra note 3, at 14, 16. Not all commentators agree that carbon emissions goals cannot be
achieved in the United States or globally without a reduction in energy demand growth at less
than business-as-usual rates. Jeff Goodell, Q&A- Bill Gates on How to Stop Global Warming,
ROLLING STONE (Dec. 9, 2010, 11:05 AM), http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/the-miracleseeker-20101028 (noting Gates's view that the climate problem arises from supply-not
consumption-issues).
Scott Barrett, The Coming Global Climate-Technology Revolution, 23 J. ECON. PERSP.
35.
53, 54 (2009); cf. Tim Foxon & Peter Pearson, Overcoming Barriersto Innovation and Diffusion of
Cleaner Technologies: Some Features of a Sustainable Innovation Policy Regime, 16 J. CLEANER
PRODUCTION S148, S151 (2008) (discussing advances in energy technology from an innovationsystems perspective).
36. The IPCC assumes a substantial amount of "spontaneous" technological development
leading to reduced energy intensity. See Roger Pielke, Jr., Tom Wigley & Christopher Green,
DangerousAssumptions, 452 NATURE 531, 531-32 (2008).
37. Peak renewable energy is a subset of peak low-carbon energy. The concept of "peak oil"
has been discussed at length, and Peter Gleick has applied the concept to "peak renewable
water." See Peter H. Gleick, Global Freshwater Resources: Soft-Path Solutions for the 21st
Century, 302 SCIENCE 1524, 1525 (2003). It is notable that there are significant differences with
how "peak" is used by economists and policymakers in different contexts. Within the context of
"peak oil," the term signifies the historical point at which there are diminishing returns to
extracting more of a supply resource. In the context of electric power generation, the term
describes the power supply deployed to meet total "peak" demand forecasts, regardless of
whether there are diminishing returns to any particular type of electric power generation source.
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globally averaged, will continue until 2050.38 As Lewis notes, this
would mean that in 2050 each person around the world would demand
on average only two kilowatts a year. 39 Currently, the average demand
per person in the United States is ten kilowatts. 40 According to Lewis,
to achieve this two kilowatt demand in the United States, "we would
need to start today to do everything possible-including using 100
mpg cars and zero-energy homes-to conserve energy." 41 Furthermore,
food production alone in Western societies requires one kilowatt per
person. 42 Reducing net energy demand thus is an essential element of
43
successful climate mitigation efforts.
B. Existing Demand-RelatedPolicy Instruments and NDR
When energy demand is at issue, energy policy debates have
largely ignored NDR and instead focused on a policy tool known as
demand-side management ("DSM"). Beginning with PURPA in the

38. Lewis, supra note 3, at 16. This assumption has also been made by the IPCC. Lewis
also notes that the United States "actually saves energy at a faster rate, about two percent per
year" because of the high per capita energy baseline consumption in the United States, relative
to developing countries. Id.
39. Lewis, supranote 34, at 812.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 812-13.
42. Id. at 813.
43. Although our primary focus is on NDR through increases in household efficiency and
conservation, many of the same opportunities for demand reduction may exist in the small
business sector. To date, energy and climate scholars have not focused on the small business
sector as a separate category of analysis. The Environmental Protection Agency does not
distinguish between small and large businesses in its annual greenhouse gas inventory. See U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990-2010,
at 1-9-1-12 (2012), available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/USGHG-Inventory-2012-Main-Text.pdf. Similarly, the Department of Commerce categorizes small
business emissions by the economic sector in which the business operates, despite including
household emissions as a separate category of analysis. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, supranote
14, at 7. For the purposes of reducing energy use and carbon emissions, however, a small
business often resembles a household more than a multinational corporation. More than twenty
million Americans work for small businesses that employ fewer than twenty people, a category
constituting 18% of the total private sector workforce. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., OFFICE OF
ADVOCACY, SMALL BUSINESS PROFILE: UNITED STATES 2, tbl.1 (2012), available at
http://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/usll.pdf (calculating percentage from 'Total" row (20,738.3
/ 114,509.6 = 0.181)). If these businesses are responsible for 18% of the total private sector
emissions, then they are responsible for 711 million metric tons of carbon dioxide emissions. See
id. (multiplying total private sector emissions, GRANADE, supra note 9, at 7, by the percentage of
small businesses employing fewer than twenty people, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., supra at 2 tbl.1).
Given the minimal number of employees, these businesses are likely to produce emissions that
more closely resemble a large household than a small factory, and if these small businesses often
resemble households, then they are ripe for efficiency gains.
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1970s, federal law envisioned a conservation direction for DSM. 44 But
PURPA and later amendments did not mandate the adoption of
conservation-minded DSM and left most implementation of federal
goals to the state and local authorities that regulate distribution
utilities. PURPA also emphasized utility rate design only, and it did
not purport to regulate how states provided for overall cost recovery to
produce revenue for utilities.
For firms in the industry and many state regulators, DSM
seems to have long left the conservation path that PURPA envisioned.
Although DSM policies might have held some promise for electric
power demand reduction in theory, as implemented, the policies often
led only to load shifting and even increased total energy usage and
electricity production. For example, many in the industry define DSM
to mean active efforts by utilities to modify use patterns in the
consumption of energy, conceding that the total level of use is not of
concern to DSM. 45 DSM appears to conflate many different concepts,
but it often emphasizes two narrow goals: (1) load shifting, or
changing the timing of energy use within one energy type (e.g.,
electricity); 46 and (2) fuel substitution, or shifting between different
47
energy sources (e.g., petroleum to electricity).

44. See James W. Moeller, Electric Demand-Side Management Under Federal Law, 13 VA.
ENVT'L L.J. 57, 57-62 (1993).
45. See JOSEPH ETO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT'L LAB., THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE
OF U.S. UTILITY DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS 1 (1996) ("DSM refers to active efforts
by electric and gas utilities to modify customers' energy use patterns."); MICHAEL F. HORDESKI,
NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY 105 (2003) ("DSM involves peak clipping, strategic
conservation, valley filling, load shifting, strategic load growth and flexible load shaping.").
Others define DSM more expansively to emphasize conservation-a goal that seems quite
consistent with federal policies to promote DSM under statutes such as PURPA, but that we
argue is hobbled by the financial incentives faced by firms in the industry and state public utility
laws. But see Bernard S. Black & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central
Planning in Regulating the U.S. Electricity Industry, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1339, 1354-55 (1994)
(noting that utilities consider DSM to include load shifting).
46. The EIA defines DSM as "[a] utility action that reduces or curtails end-use equipment
or processes," but emphasizes that "DSM is often used in order to reduce customer load during
peak demand and/or in times of supply constraint." See Glossary, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.,
http://205.254.135.7/tools/glossary/index.cfm?id=D (last visited Sept. 6, 2012).
47. A classic example is utility-sponsored electric lawn mower exchange programs, which
would reduce emissions from combustion lawnmowers in certain areas but increase the amount
of electricity used. See LeRoy C. Paddock, Green Governance: Building the Competencies
Necessary for Effective Environmental Management, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10609, 10622 (2008)
(describing exchange program implemented by Clean Air Minnesota, a program managed by the
Chamber of Commerce via the Minnesota Environmental Initiative). DSM for natural gas
utilities has also encouraged switching from electric to natural gas water heaters and stoves. See
Steven D. Czajkowski, Note, Focusing on Demand Side Management in the Future of the Electric
Grid, 4 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L. 115, 132 (2010).
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Contemporary energy policy proposals at the national level
highlight this problem. For example, so-called "Smart Grid" programs,
a major funding priority of the Department of Energy ("DOE") under
the Obama Administration, emphasize load shifting through criticalpeak, time-of-day, and real-time pricing. 48 Electric car programs,
another major DOE priority, emphasize fuel substitution by shifting
the automobile fleet from petroleum to electricity. 49 The carbon
reduction benefits of shifting from petroleum to electricity vary based
on the timing of vehicle recharge. In many areas of the country,
utilities have incentives to shift recharging to off-peak, low-cost times.
The effect is to shift the electricity source from natural gas turbines to
coal-fired units, however, and in many areas this shift will increase
the carbon emissions attributable to use of the electric vehicles. In
these situations, the time-shifting form of DSM may actually increase
50
total carbon emissions.
Smart meter programs also reflect the focus of DSM on shifting
electricity use from peak to off-peak hours rather than on reducing
total energy demand. Smart meter programs, which provide
immediate information on household electricity use, are often used to
shift household energy demand from peak to off-peak periods (e.g., by
facilitating variable rate pricing schemes or allowing remote shutdown
of air conditioners or pool pumps at peak periods). These programs
could give customers real-time information about the price and
amount of electricity used in the household. Although over the long
run retail electricity prices can be expected to have a substantial effect
on household energy demand, rate regulation of electric power in most
states has kept consumers from having experience with electricity
price fluctuations. Research suggests that people often have limited or
51
incorrect information about what activities use the most electricity.

48. Elias L. Quinn & Adam L. Reed, Envisioning the Smart Grid: Network Architecture,
Information Control, and the Public Policy BalancingAct, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 833, 842 (2010).
49. See, e.g., Ashley Morris Bale, The Newest Frontierin Motor Vehicle Emission Control:
The Clean Fuel Vehicle, 15 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 213, 268 (1995-96).
50. See, e.g., Joshua Graff Zivin, Matthew T. Kotchen & Erin T. Mansur, Spatial and
Temporal Heterogeneity of Marginal Emissions: Implications for Electric Cars and Other
Electricity-Shifting Policies (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18462, Oct.
2012) (noting that in the upper Midwest charging electric vehicles during recommended
nighttime hours increases electric car emissions to levels that are higher than the average gaspowered vehicle on the road); see also Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 24, at 76668 (examining research on the implications of peak versus off-peak electricity generation for the
carbon emissions associated with recharging electric cars).
51. Shazeen Attari et al., Public Perceptions of Energy Consumption and Savings, 107
PROC. NAT'L. AcAD. Sci. 16054, 16057 (2010). This is true about other forms of energy use as
well. See, e.g., Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of Idling Beliefs and Behavior
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Not surprisingly, consumer responses to variable or dynamic pricing
have been disappointing.5 2 Notably, just providing real-time
information in homes about costs and impacts associated with electric
power usage, without introducing price variations, can reduce
electricity use by roughly 5 to 15%.5 3 Yet from the perspective of
utilities in many parts of the United States, this kind of demand
reduction, when not tied to dynamic pricing, might occur at times
when electricity production is low cost, leading to utility revenue
erosion. Not surprisingly, utilities have focused less on using smart
meters and other devices to provide households with information that
would reduce overall household electricity use than on shifting use to
off-peak periods. Shifting use to off-peak periods will reduce the need
for firms to invest in new base load plants and will save money by
allowing them to deploy their existing base load resources at capacity.
But this timing shift often can increase carbon emissions. The focus on
load shifting has induced utilities to link smart meter programs to
dynamic pricing schemes, even though the higher rates at peak
54
periods have often been very unpopular with customers.
DSM that is directed toward shifting peak use to off-peak use is
popular with utilities, and as we discuss below, policies that follow
this view of DSM seem especially attractive to incumbent firms to the
extent they help firms maximize their revenues from energy sales.
Utilities often have an incentive to shift demand from high-cost
natural gas turbines at peak load periods to lower-cost coal-fired or

in Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL'Y 2881, 2882-84 (2009) (examining myths about
motor vehicle idling).
52. On the effects of dynamic pricing, see Paul L. Joskow & Catherine D. Wolfram,
Dynamic Pricingof Electricity, 102 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 381 (2012); Electricity Prices
and Conservation: Do Current Policies Reduce Consumption?, RES. REV. (Energy Institute at
HAAS, Berkeley, CA), Spring 2011, at 1, 4-5, 7 (discussing the effects of changes of electricity
pricing in California).
53. KAREN EHRHARDT-MARTINEZ ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY EFFICIENT ECON.,
ADVANCED METERING INITIATIVES AND RESIDENTIAL FEEDBACK PROGRAMS: A META-REVIEW FOR
HOUSEHOLD ELECTRICITY-SAVING OPPORTUNITIES 39 (2010), available at http://www.
acee.org/research-report/el05 (discussing real-time household electricity feedback); see also Hunt
Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy, 327 SCIENCE 1204, 1204 (2010)
(discussing monthly feedback on electricity use); Ian Ayres et al., Evidence from Two Large Field
Experiments that Peer ComparisonFeedback Can Reduce Residential Energy Usage 13-15 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15386, 2009), available at http://www.nber.
org/papers/w15386.pdf (finding significant reductions in home energy caused by peer comparison
reports). The effects of information on energy use have been shown to occur even for individuals
who are not responsible for paying for the bills. See Amanda Carrico & Manuel Riemer,
Motivating Energy Conservation in the Workplace: An Evaluation of the Use of Group-Level
Feedback and Peer Education, 31 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 1, 10 (2011).
54. See Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 24, at 730-40 (discussing consumer
responses to dynamic pricing).
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nuclear base load units at off-peak periods because deploying
resources in an off-peak period can lead to overall increases in total
kilowatt-hour sales of electricity without any need for any additional
capital investment. 55 At the extreme, DSM can increase a utility's
strategic overall load, increase the overall demand for electricity, and
maximize its revenues-a profitable strategy some in the industry call
"strategic load management."5 6 Although approaches vary from state
to state, because of the failure to fully embrace NDR, DSM programs
have had only a modest impact on the total demand for electricity57
decreasing less than 2% of demand over the long term.
The carbon implications of shifting the timing of energy
demand or the source of energy supply are also very different when
NDR is emphasized as an independent goal. NDR does not assume
energy usage is constant, that the shape of the demand curve is fixed
over time or across fuels, or that the demand curve is inevitably
shifting outward. Instead, NDR also emphasizes reducing aggregate
demand by changing the shape of the demand curve or shifting it
inward. We focus here on reductions in aggregate demand.5 8 By subtly
shifting the debate from reducing the amount of energy used to the
timing of the use, many DSM policy initiatives claim to focus on
demand but only do so in a way that focuses on timing of use, not
reducing overall consumption.
Less explored, but equally important, DSM policies may lead to
increases in carbon emissions by increasing the importance of highcarbon base load units to the utility. DSM can shift load to avoid
deployment of gas peakers, but this might cause total demand to
increase. Even if total demand does not increase, DSM may increase

55.

BRANDON DAVITO ET AL., McKINSEY & Co., THE SMART GRID AND THE PROMISE OF

38-39
(2010),
available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/
DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT
Search.aspx?q=demand%20side %20management.
56. See C.W. Gellings, The Concept of Demand Side Management for Electric Utilities, 73
PROC. INST. ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS 1468, 1468 (1985) (describing marketing

and strategic load growth as benefits of DSM).
57.
See TOSHI H. ARIMURA ET AL., RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE, COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF
ELECTRICITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY PROGRAMS
3-4 (2011), available at http://www.rff.

org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-09-48-REV.pdf (estimating that DSM expenditures from 1992 to 2006
produced a 0.9% savings over that period and a 1.8% longer term savings); see also Nic Rivers &
Mark Jaccard, Electric Utility Demand Side Management in Canada,ENERGY J., No. 4, 2011, at
93, 108-12 (finding that investments in DSM in Canada did not have a substantial impact on
overall electricity consumption).
58. See Douglas A. Kysar & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Introduction: Climate Change and
Consumption, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10825, 10825-33 (2008) (discussing the need to address
aggregate consumption of energy and goods and the reluctance of the Supreme Court to interpret
the National Environmental Policy Act to require evaluation of consumption reduction as
opposed to the effects of building new generation units).
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dependence on the lowest-cost base load plants, which are often coalfired units. 59 In fact, emphasizing peak capacity as a way of allocating
energy usage over time may be pushing demand to base load through
DSM. This focus on peak capacity feeds on itself, as more consistent
demand over time means that base load units become even more
important to a utility's system. The more that a utility invests in base
load generation units, the more electricity it needs to sell to pay for
them.
More recent federal policy efforts also do not require DSM to
address NDR and may even undermine it. In 2005, Congress passed
legislation that required DOE to evaluate the impacts of demand
response.60 DOE reported to Congress on demand response initiatives
in 2006, finding that limited demand response opportunities currently
exist and that "[s]tates should consider aggressive implementation of
61
price-based demand response for retail customers as a high priority."
DOE found that demand response potential in 2004 was "about 20,500
megawatts (MW), 3% of total U.S. peak demand, while actual
delivered peak demand reduction was about 9,000 MW," or 1.3% of
total peak demand. 62 These initiatives conflate DSM and NDR,
however, rather than address the distinct challenge of NDR.
In addition, two aspects of DOE's recent push towards DSM
further entrench the NDR blind spot in energy demand policy. The
first is DOE's emphasis on reducing peak consumption as its primary
demand response goal. This is consistent with the dominant approach
to DSM and to preserving a focus on regulation designed to ensure
revenue recovery for capital costs associated with a peak that is
defined with respect to individual base load plants. Second, DOE
continues to look to states, rather than the federal government, as the
primary innovators for demand response policies. DOE's emphasis on
states for demand response solutions is not surprising, given that the
Federal Power Act protects state jurisdiction over retail rates. 63 But
this also means that the ultimate responsibility for demand initiatives
that flow through to the customer level will remain with state
59. Clean Air Act standards might help to soften this effect to some extent regarding coal if
the standards regulate hourly emissions rather than average or daily, weekly, or monthly
emissions. For example, this may be effective for sulfur dioxide.
60.
BENEFITS OF DEMAND RESPONSE IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR ACHIEVING THEM, A REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 1252
OF THE ENERGY POLICY ACT OF 2005, at v (2006), available at http://energy.gov
/sites/prod/fles/oeprod/DocumentsandMedia/DOE-Benefits-of Demand-Response-in-Electricity
_Markets andRecommendations-forAchievingThemReport-to Congress.pdf.
61.

Id.

62.

Id. at v n.2.

63.

See id. at 52 n.58.
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regulators, rather than the federal government, and that their
regulatory approach will be important to meeting federal goals related
to DSM.
C. DistributionUtilities as NDR Gatekeepers
Electric distributors are perhaps the most important actors for
demand reduction. The traditional electric utility provides bundled
generation, transmission, and distribution services to retail customers
under rates regulated based on the cost of service, as determined
based on the costs of producing electricity. Such firms set or affect
retail prices in most jurisdictions; have monthly communications with
retail consumers; control access to efficiency, conservation, and
renewable energy generation options; determine the transaction costs
households will occur in adopting new technologies or participating in
conservation programs; and lobby for and against demand-related
measures with federal, state, and local governments. 64 Electric
distributors also set standards and require approvals for connecting
with the local grid, such as the approvals necessary for installation of
solar photovoltaic systems. They provide information through bills
and advertising that can promote 65 or discourage6 6 demand reduction.
They also maintain large staffs of technicians that interact with
households on a frequent basis.
In these ways, the distribution utility serves as an
intermediary and gatekeeper between the consumer and the electric
grid. A utility that has incentives to reduce household or other
demand for electricity can play its information, service, and access
roles in ways that will induce widespread uptake of efficiency and
conservation measures. A utility that does not can discourage
widespread uptake of these measures and can do so in a variety of
nontransparent ways, whether by increasing consumers' transaction
costs (e.g., by requiring numerous or slow approvals for household
solar photovoltaic installation, by understaffing key positions
necessary for promotion of efficiency and conservation programs, and
64. See, e.g., Brandon Hofmeister, Bridging the Gap: Using Social Psychology to Design
Market Interventions to Overcome the Energy Efficiency Gap in Residential Energy Markets, 19
SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 1, 62 (2010) (noting that if private utilities can be properly
incentivized to maximize energy efficiency, they can be "particularly effective delivery
mechanisms for energy efficiency programs," and that "utilities are perceived to be a trusted
source of information on efficiency and energy use ... [and] that information provided by utilities
will often have more impact than information provided by other sources").
65. An example would include switching incandescent bulbs to compact fluorescent lamps.
66. Examples include encouraging the purchase of larger electric water heaters, or electric
as opposed to gas water heaters.
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by imposing stringent requirements on grid access), or by limiting the
extent or efficacy of information proyided to consumers (e.g., 67by not
making prompt, in-home energy use feedback easily available).
D. Regulatory Incentives for Efficiency and Conservation
Whether a public entity (such as a municipal utility) or a
private firm, the distribution utility historically operated as a
monopoly and was (and in many respects largely remains) regulated
by a state regulatory commission whose mission emphasizes
protection of consumers from abuses by the monopolist. In the early
era of energy regulation, efficient supply was the goal, so protecting
consumers became a priority. Importantly, protecting consumers was
framed as providing low rates for customers, not necessarily low total
consumer expenditures on electricity. Regulators used ratemaking as
the principal tool to provide low electric rates for consumers. Low
electric rates resonated politically with many consumers and
consumer advocacy groups, and this "low rate mindset" continues to
resonate, even if it is not always in the interest of consumers.
Although low rates have obvious appeal to consumers and
consumer advocates, the impacts of low rates on consumers are mixed.
To the extent they enable increased energy use, low rates allow
consumers to satisfy preferences for more energy-using services, such
as the additional cooling provided by lowering the thermostat in the
summer or the entertainment from new electronic equipment. At the
same time, low rates undermine incentives to acquire information
about energy use, to purchase more efficient appliances, and to reduce
waste, such as by taking simple behavioral steps that have very small
pecuniary or cognitive costs but large effects on the quantity of
electricity used (e.g., turning up the thermostat when leaving the
home for long periods in the summer). In addition, by creating
incentives for utilities to increase the overall quantity of electricity
that customers purchase, low rates create hydraulic pressure in the
system for increasing supply, undermining the ability to substitute
low-carbon for high-carbon sources. Low rates thus can lead to higher
total consumer costs in the long run by undermining incentives for
efficiency and conservation and can undercut efforts to reduce the
carbon emissions from electricity generation.
Less obvious is why the low-rate mindset found favor with
regulated utilities. A monopoly firm with market power typically will

67. As discussed above, such feedback has been shown to reduce residential electricity use
by 5% to 15%. EHRHARDT-MARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 53, at 39.
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favor charging higher rather than lower per-unit prices, but rate
regulation guaranteed cost recovery for capital investments associated
with generating electricity while also ensuring a high volume of power
sales. Volumetric pricing-selling more units at lower cost-remains
the dominant business model for electric utilities. The NDR blind spot
can be traced to the incentives under which both firms and regulators
operate with volumetric pricing and its related approach to
investment risks. To the extent the dominant approach to utility rate
structures favors volumetric rates, utilities are encouraged to offer low
per-unit rates while increasing their total sales. This allows them to
recoup the business costs associated with their capital investments in
base load power and transmission, and to increase net revenues over
the long term.
Low rates are not problematic to a utility so long as the volume
of power sold increases sufficiently to make up for the lost revenue
from the low rate. If low rates undermine incentives for consumers to
invest in more energy efficient technologies or to avoid waste, and
thus increase total consumer expenditures on electricity that exceed
the revenue loss from low per-unit rates, the utility prospers. So long
as consumer advocates focus on low per-unit rates as the goal of
ratemaking proceedings, rather than consumers' total electricity costs,
consumer advocates can achieve their goal in a way that the utility is
happy to accommodate. Consumer advocates can announce success in
holding down rates, and utilities can increase their revenue each year
as low rates induce increased consumption and undermine incentives
to invest in efficiency and conservation.
Thus, although often against consumers' long-term interests,
consumer advocacy groups often take the bait offered and focus on low
rates, and utilities are quite happy to feed it to them. On the surface,
both groups win: utilities increase revenues, and consumer groups
report success to their stakeholders on lower rates, even though
consumers' total costs will go up in the long run. The total costs to
consumers are more important but less obvious to consumers and
voters. In addition, the regulator is in a sweet spot, since both utilities
and consumer advocacy groups are placated. The losers in this
arrangement are consumers, who end up spending more money each
year on electricity, as increased usage outstrips low rates, and
everyone who is adversely affected by an electricity generation and
distribution system that is constantly in need of increasing supply.
The incentives of consumer advocates, utilities, and regulators
in the low-rate regime are reflected in the dominant approach to DSM.
The shift in timing of consumption that many energy policies seek to
achieve under current conceptions of DSM promises firms enhanced
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revenue with their current business model under the rate structures
applicable in most states. By focusing on shifting the timing of
demand, not on reducing net demand with efficiency and conservation
programs, DSM programs offer the near-term appeal of less costly
power, but they miss the opportunity to enable customers to use less
electricity overall and to spend less on electricity in the long run. So
long as consumer advocates, utilities, and regulators focus on low perunit rates, however, it should not be surprising that utilities favor
DSM over NDR and view efficiency and conservation as revenue
erosion; effective overall demand reduction programs will lead to less
total electricity use and thus less total revenue from consumers.
Given electric distribution utilities' incentives in most
jurisdictions, it is hardly a surprise that utilities' implementation of
demand reduction measures has been inconsistent. Serious initiatives
to reduce demand have occurred on a one-off, local basis, not with the
aggressive, widespread implementation necessary to achieve a
behavioral wedge. As a general matter, state regulators have not been
very effective at changing firms' financial incentives. In fact, DSM
policies were adopted in most states under the cost recovery model of
traditional rate regulation, which sees stabilizing and increasing the
sales of energy as the main business model for generating revenue-a
strong business incentive that is at direct odds with efficiency and
conservation goals. Of course, efforts to manage demand produce costs
for electric utilities, just as new generation facilities can produce costs.
If deemed prudent by regulators, these costs are typically built into
the approved rates for regulated utilities. Yet the kinds of DSM
programs that regulated firms have sought, and that regulators tend
to approve, emphasize load-shifting and fuel substitution along with
marketing and strategic load growth, and they ignore, or at least
underemphasize, NDR. An Electric Power Research Institutesponsored report bluntly highlights the problem: "The heart of a DSM
program is a series of measures intended to encourage one or more
specific groups of customers to modify their energy usage patterns in a
68
manner consistent with the utility's objectives."
Empirical analysis has determined that utility estimates of the
actual conservation savings associated with DSM investments to date
are often overstated. 69 One reason is that DSM's emphasis on load

68.
AHMAD FARuQuI & JOHN H. CHAMBERLIN, ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., PRINCIPLES
AND PRACTICE OF DEMAND-SIDE MANAGEMENT, at ES-1 (1993) (emphasis added).

69. See Maximilian Auffhammer, Carl Blumstein & Meredith Fowlie, Demand-Side
Management and Energy Efficiency Revisited, ENERGY J., No. 3, 2008, at 91, 91 ("The key finding
of Loughran and Kulick (2004) . . . is that utilities have been overstating electricity savings ...
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management, fuel substitution, and strategic load growth has masked
the impacts of energy policies on total demand. NDR emphasizes the
need to confront these impacts. NDR therefore captures an important
goal that DSM, in its practical implementation, fails to emphasize,
and that merits attention in its own right as a regulatory tool in
discussions regarding efficiency, conservation, and demand reduction.
Even in states with traditional rate structures, utilities may
feel some public pressure to promote conservation and efficiency. For a
firm that is rewarded on a volumetric sales basis, demand shifting to
off-peak periods can lower costs and produce some limited efficiencies.
For these firms, however, aggregate demand reduction also comes at a
significant cost. In retail rate-regulated environments, utilities can be
expected to seek demand reduction only if regulators offer to provide
them a guaranteed return for it. Similar incentives can be expected for
gas and water utilities.
In sum, so long as volumetric pricing and guaranteed cost
recovery through regulated rates leads utilities to view efficiency and
conservation as revenue erosion, they will have incentives to create an
appearance of demand reduction (e.g., to maintain reputation, satisfy
regulators' demands, etc.), but under the existing approach neither
utilities nor customers can be expected to be firmly committed to
reducing the aggregate usage of electricity. In fact, many utilities
would be lowering their short-term return on investment and risking
their ability to recover the capital costs of their investment in
generation plants if they induced meaningful aggregate demand
reduction among their residential or business customers. Aware of
this implication of NDR, the American Public Power Association has
warned, "[a] reduction in sales.., leads to a greater reduction in
revenues than in costs, and potentially can threaten a utility's
financial health."70 The history of utility efficiency and conservation
programs around the country-highly touted programs that are not
designed or implemented to exploit the full potential for household
demand reduction, as opposed to programs and innovations designed
to "go viral" among customers or reduce electricity use on a
71
widespread basis-reflects this mixed incentive.

associated with energy efficiency ...(DSM) programs."). But see id. ("Our results suggest that
the evidence for rejecting utility estimates of DSM savings and costs should be re-interpreted.").
70. AM. PUB. POWER ASS'N, supra note 23, at 3.
71. For example, the utility industry has been slow to adopt social media techniques.
Carolyn Elefant, The "Power" of Social Media: Legal Issues & Best Practices for Utilities
EngagingSocial Media, 32 ENERGY L.J. 1, 5 (2011).
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E. NDR and Incentives for Alternative Supply Options
Similar issues arise regarding generation of electricity at the
household level. Penetration of renewables into power supply is
unlikely to occur if electric distributors lack incentives to permit,
much less actively encourage, substantial increases in the supply of
household-generated electricity. 72 As a general rule, investments in
alternative supply options are not consistent with volumetric rates,
such as investments in distributed renewable generation by either
consumers or nonutility firms. The historic emphasis on promoting
low rates influences how regulated utilities and regulators view the
risks associated with infrastructure investments in power production
and delivery, reinforcing an industry-wide approach to planning and
building power generators that favors base load plants over renewable
projects.
Small-scale, low-carbon energy projects (such as household
solar photovoltaic installation) share many characteristics with
household efficiency and conservation since they reduce the demand
for centralized generation and transmission by supplying energy
onsite. As with efforts to reduce demand, renewable energy scholars
have noted that the process of installing household renewable
generation systems must become routine if these systems are to make
a substantial contribution to the supply of low-carbon energy. 73 Yet
firms and regulators have a strong preference for base load generators
over renewable plants, because investments in base load plants (which
tend to be large-scale nuclear and coal plants, or hydro facilities) can
be justified as providing power on a reliable basis twenty-four hours a
74
day.
Diversification of electric power generation towards renewable
resources is especially responsive to reductions in demand because
most renewable resources deploy at a smaller scale and do not
immediately scale up the way traditional fossil fuel plants do. To the
extent these renewable sources reduce a customer's demand and this
effect is multiplied across all customers on a utility's network, this

72. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 UTAH ENVTL.
L. REV. 339, 339-40 (2010) (discussing the importance of incentives to overcome the current
distributional status quo of utilities).
73. See, e.g., id. at 340 (discussing the need for "routinization" of household solar services).
74. Fuel storage after generation, a serious problem that plagues nuclear generation, is an
issue beyond the scope of this Article.
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total reduction in demand can offset the need for larger scale
75
investments in base load fossil plants and transmission facilities.
A formidable obstacle to this kind of penetration for renewable
energy is that the conventional approach to planning and building
base load power plants assumes that the statistical certainty that
customers are able to receive reliable power twenty-four hours a day is
a requirement for every generation unit. That approach keeps both
regulators and distribution utilities from valuing smaller-scale
distributed renewable facilities. Once built, a base load unit will
operate most efficiently at or near its capacity level. The large capital
investment in a base load plant can crowd out alternative sources of
electricity supply as utility engineers make decisions to dispatch
individual plants to meet demand at the margin, and operation of a
base load plant will typically be most efficient where it is working at
or near capacity. Also, expanded transmission, once built, creates an
incentive for utilities to wheel in the lowest-cost power options from
the wholesale market, which will tend to be from base load plants.
Although some of these plants are low-carbon nuclear plants, most of
the power generated at these plants is drawn from coal-fired
generators.
Instead of evaluating the statistical certainty of reliability
plant-by-plant, an alternative approach views reliability as a
characteristic of the power system as a whole. For example, a
widespread network of renewable resources could provide a stable and
predictable source of electricity without expanding transmission or the
number of base load power plants. 76 Interconnected and redundant
smaller-scale generators, including distributed renewable projects, can
serve as a type of insurance against reliability interruptions.
Moreover, viewing reliability at the systems level allows demand
reduction to play a role as a mechanism for enhancing reliability.
Power engineers who operate the grid on a daily basis for regional
transmission systems already see their risk management challenge
from the perspective of the complete mix of power generation options,
rather than focusing on reliability as a feature of an individual power
75. Terms such as "demand" and "energy" are terms of art among utility regulators,
especially in the ratemaking process. For them, "demand" frequently refers to the capacity
designed to meet customer peaks. "Energy" often refers to the fuel costs associated with
deploying demand to serve particular customers. In this Article we use the terms in a more
conventional manner, consistent with lay and economic understandings of demand.
76. For an example of how a combined heat and power natural gas distributed generation
can produce similar system benefits, see DRAGOLJUB KOSANOVIC & CHRISTOPHER BEEBE, CTR.
FOR ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, SYSTEM WIDE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF
DISTRIBUTED

GENERATION

IN THE NEW

ENGLAND

ENERGY MARKET (2005),

http://ceere.org/iac/pubsdownloads/DG%2Benefits/2OReport.pdf.

available at
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plant. Despite this, for the firm, rather than a larger regional system
operator, the dominant approach to building and planning power
plants conflates an individual firm's business risks with the risks of
reliability interruptions, leading firms to invest in overcapacity, largescale power plants, and transmission as the main mechanisms for
reliability enhancement. This preference for overcapacity fits with the
history of most electric power investments in the twentieth century,
which were primarily base load plants. Low customer rates financed
these investments, as accompanying demand growth provided a
predictable source of revenue to protect the firm's large-scale
investment risks and encouraged firms to conflate minimizing
reliability risks with minimizing business risks associated with
potential revenue decreases. As wholesale markets have evolved, and
day-to-day operation decisions about the grid are increasingly made by
power system operators, the separation between the operational
decisions regarding the grid as a system and the investment decisions
of the firm have become even greater.
The preference for low rates and their accompanying base load
plant investment cycle is not a purely private phenomenon. By
emphasizing volumetric rates, public regulators' ratemaking practices
for most distribution utilities reinforce a consumption mentality that
takes supply for granted. By focusing primarily on low per-unit rates,
utilities can get what they are incentivized to want: the appearance of
responsiveness to consumers along with growing total payments from
consumers to utilities. And the public utility commissions ("PUCs")
and consumer groups can say they are delivering what consumers
want, but that is only true if the issue is framed as low rates, not low
bills. Volumetric rates help keep per-unit prices low and encourage
firms to sell as much electricity as possible, rather than increase price
and decrease unit sales. They are also consistent with the idea of
keeping per-customer demand charges low; investing in base load
capacity leads to high "demand" charges on bills (the portion of fixed
costs allocated to customers), so that once such investments are made,
the base load cycle is reinforced by regulators allocating demand
charges plus energy charges on a per-unit basis. By keeping energy
charges low, this increases per-unit consumption and also increases
overall bills.

III. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This is a propitious time for state and local regulators to take
the aggregate demand for electricity seriously in their policy
initiatives and to examine new approaches to overcome the conceptual
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and practical barriers to NDR. In 2011, five years after DOE's initial
report on demand response, DOE and the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") issued a new report calling for a national
demand response policy, responding in part to Congress's request in
the Energy Independence & Security Act ("EISA") in 2007. 77 In
contrast to previous demand response efforts, in the new report DOE
and FERC promote a greater federal role in demand response efforts,
including development of tools and templates to assist states in
78
demand response initiatives.
Memorializing such efforts, FERC's landmark new rule on
demand reduction provides wholesale utilities with incentives to
reduce their demand for electricity, 79 an approach that FERC
Chairman Wellinghoff has referred to as the "killer application" for
the electric power industry.8 0 This approach could introduce incentives
for demand reduction for the largest-scale transactions, but whether it
will lead to reductions in actual customer demand will depend on the
responses of individual utilities in the pricing of retail sales to
customers. We see two particular impediments, however, to current
federal demand response policy fully realizing its potential. The first is
a lack of a carbon-pricing apparatus, which we discuss further below.
The second is that, even if federal efforts to address demand are well
intended, the retail sales of electric distribution utilities remain
regulated by states, not FERC. To the extent retail utilities still have
strong volumetric sales incentives, as they do in most jurisdictions,
any attempt at wholesale demand reduction will be muted. The scope
of the federal jurisdiction to address demand for electric power is
limited,8 1 and many demand response solutions remain vague.
We examine three policy options that are being deployed to
address the demand growth problem: (1) social cost approaches such
77.

FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM'N & DEP'T OF ENERGY, IMPLEMENTATION PROPOSAL

FOR THE NATIONAL ACTION PLAN ON DEMAND RESPONSE iii (2011), available at http://energy.gov
/sites/prodfiles/oeprod/DocumentsandMedialImplementationProposalforNAPDRFinal.pdf.
78. Id. at 4-10.
79. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed.
Reg. 16,658, 16,678 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
80. Kate Galbraith, Dimming the Lights to Meet Demand, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Apr.
17, 2009, 8:02 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/dimming-the-lights-to-meet-

demand/.
81. The FERC's jurisdiction extends only to wholesale power supply transactions, and
states retain jurisdiction over retail sales to customers. For discussion of the limited jurisdiction
FERC has in implementing demand response, see Richard J. Pierce, A Primer on Demand
Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 105-06
(2012) (noting that the FERC has limited ability to overcome the reluctance of states to adopt
retail systems that will create appropriate incentives and pass the savings of demand response
on to customers).
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as carbon pricing; (2) performance standards such as demand
reduction mandates; and (3) decoupling initiatives. We conclude that a
combination of all three approaches will be necessary to overcome the
long history of financial incentives created by volumetric pricing and
the accompanying mindset that limits utility, consumer, and PUC
commitment to NDR. Embracing all three policies would recognize
that electricity distribution utilities should not be viewed as simply
selling electricity to customers, but as providing a service that
produces positive social and economic value for the energy system.
Energy services may actually include selling technologies or services
that enable the sale of less electricity. Such a model holds promise to
induce demand reduction, in the form of both improved efficiency and
conservation, by creating positive value for firms. Large, sophisticated
customers, such as large industrial consumers of electricity, already
know that it is in their interest to focus on demand reduction. They
have strong incentives to invest in demand reduction, and many have
already taken the initiative to reduce their demand.8 2 Smaller-scale
household customers achieve less obvious benefits (they have lower
energy costs), but as the discussion in Part II.A demonstrates, the
collective benefit of all customers reducing demand is substantial. The
energy services business model would have far-reaching implications
for utility decisions that affect NDR.
A. CarbonPricingand Social Cost Approaches to Demand Reduction
The emphasis of volumetric pricing on low rates provides little
incentive for utilities and customers to pay attention to the carbon
impacts of energy use. The commonplace policy solution to
environmental externalities such as carbon emissions focuses on
internalizing social costs by making them private. In theory, the
optimal policy instrument is a carbon tax. Such a tax would increase
the cost of producing and selling electricity from high-carbon fuels,
encouraging firms and customers to adjust their energy production
and use in response to prices that fully reflect the social cost of carbon
emissions. In the electricity context, high prices for electricity
generated from high-carbon fuels would make alternative supply
options, such as renewable energy, more attractive, and would lead to
reductions in demand by consumers. Yet a national carbon tax or capand-trade system is unlikely to be adopted and implemented in the
82. This is because energy costs for larger customers will be greater, producing greater
dollar savings per individual customer. Any expensive meters or energy audits will be more
affordable to larger customers with cash flow, such as businesses, which also face competitive
pressure to reduce their energy costs as much as possible.
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United States in the near term. Failure to bend the carbon curve
during this time will mean not only greater stocks of carbon in the
atmosphere, but substantial growth in annual carbon emissions and
83
the possibility of passing tipping points in the climate system.
Even though adoption of a national carbon tax or cap-and-trade
system is unlikely in the near term, however, state regulators may be
able to internalize the social costs of carbon indirectly if they
reengineer the ratemaking process to emphasize the actual costs of
carbon emissions rather than the private market costs of supplying
electricity. A social cost approach could readily fit within the existing
process by which state regulators determine utility rates based on the
cost of service. Now that the Office of Management and Budget has
established a range for the social cost of carbon,8 4 designing an
electricity rate to be welfare enhancing could readily incorporate the
social cost of the carbon emitted from the generation of the
electricity.8 5 If state utility regulators were to price carbon emissions
and build them into utility rates as a cost, it would produce higher
per-unit rates.
The effect would be twofold: customers would have incentives
to use less electricity as the per-unit price goes up, and utilities would
have incentives to invest in reducing demand for fossil fuel-generated
electricity. Even if the current measure of carbon costs is not precise,
utility regulators have mechanisms at their disposal to true up
adjustments as new information is gathered in the future. For

83. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 28, at 403-04 (discussing tipping points and
feedback effects in the climate system).
84. The social cost of carbon is the present value of future damages caused by one metric
ton of greenhouse gas emissions; the working group that calculated the social cost of carbon
produced a range of $5 to $65 per metric ton, with $21 per metric ton as the central figure of
analysis. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF CARBON, U.S. GOV'T, APPENDIX 15A,
SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at
3 (2010), available at http://wwwl.eere.energy.gov/buildings/appliancestandards/commercial
/pdfs/smallmotors tsd/sem_finalrule-appendixl5a.pdf. There is reason to believe that the range
of social costs of carbon generated through the OMB process does not fully reflect the tail risks
that many climate scientists have identified. See Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate
Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1557, 1581 (2011) ("[T]he
IWG's recommendations are not adequately defended. Many of its errors are likely errors of
underestimation: it is likely that the IWG does not incorporate all the potential harms of global
warming, and thus underestimates the benefits of curbing emissions.").
85. For commentary on the working group results and process, see Jody Freeman &
Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 41 ENVTL. L. REP 10695, 10721-23 (2010);
Douglas A. Kysar, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on "7?etakingRationality Two Years
Later", 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 57-66 (2011); Vandenbergh & Gilligan, supra note 28, at 406-07.
For a discussion on the prevalent approach to evaluating discount rates for cost-benefit analysis
of climate change mitigation efforts, see generally Richard L. Revesz & Matthew R. Shahabian,
Climate Change and Future Generations,84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097 (2011).
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example, based on the likelihood of error in carbon cost calculations,
regulators could contribute a percentage of the cost to a trust fund,
which would allow for adjustments in the future as new information
about carbon impacts is processed.
We favor such an approach, but we think it also is not
politically feasible in the near term and is unlikely to be a complete
solution to the problem. Increasing utility rates to reflect social costs,
rather than business costs, is likely to be politically unpopular at the
state and local level, where a populist consumer protection message
dominates in the rate-setting process and focuses on near-term
consumer pecuniary interests, not long-term consumer welfare. The
political appeal of a decentralized, state-centric approach to adopting
implicit carbon pricing in ratemaking varies geographically, and
opposition to carbon regulation appears strongest in states that use
the most carbon-intense fuels.86 Moreover, using a state ratemaking
process to impose a carbon tax implicitly does not guarantee changes
in generation choices if utilities simply pass that cost through to
customers and increase their own profits rather than invest in lowercarbon power sources. Given the strong financial incentives that
attract firms to large-scale base load sources of energy, use of carbonintensive fuels is likely to continue at high levels without some kind of
supplemental regulatory approach designed to change firm
investment decisions. A carbon-pricing approach, if adopted in
isolation, thus does not guarantee changes in the supply of new lowcarbon electricity sources and places its bet almost entirely on a hope
that the demand for electricity is elastic.
A more feasible approach would be for PUCs to be more
mindful of social costs in evaluating utilities' investments in NDR
during the ratemaking process. Efforts to reduce demand may require
the expenditure of dollars by utilities, and thus regulators will need to
determine whether NDR investments (e.g., investments in
infrastructure such as metering and other energy efficiency services)
are prudent or cost effective. A social cost approach to evaluating NDR
would not only be attentive to NDR's costs but also would recognize its
benefits, including its potential for reductions in carbon emissions
over the fuel cycle of various sources of electricity. This would require
regulators to take a broader approach to assessing the cost
effectiveness of various utility investments and fuels than occurs with
the current emphasis on volumetric rates and near-term consumer
protection goals. Many states use a rate impact measure ("RIM") test
86. See, e.g., Felicity Barringer, Climate Legislation Sends Chill Through Areas Fueled by
Coal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2009, at A17.
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to evaluate the prudency of investments in DSM, examining the
overall effect of DSM investments on customer rates. The RIM
approach encourages overinvestment in the kind of DSM that is at
odds with NDR and with carbon-pricing strategies that may be
87
adopted in the future.
States should consider and evaluate the use of alternative tests
for investments in NDR, focusing on total resource costs or societal
costs in comparing NDR investments to their alternatives.8 8 Such
approaches might assess the cost effectiveness of NDR from a larger
system perspective, taking into account positive environmental
externalities associated with these investments, including the cost of
89
the full fuel cycle for alternative approaches to generating electricity.
Even if regulators do not price carbon in ratemaking, if they begin to
look at carbon impacts in evaluating the cost effectiveness of various
investments, this could improve firms' ability to evaluate the risks of
reliability from a systems perspective, could provide a way out of the
current overemphasis on base load plants, and could make NDR a
more appealing option to utilities. 90

87. As discussed in Part II, it is important to highlight that the current energy policy
emphasis at the federal and state levels on smart meters does not adequately confront the
problem, and may even reinforce it. Smart meter technology holds promise to give customers
information about their power usage to influence when and how they use energy. See
Vandenbergh, Carrico & Bressman, supra note 24, at 739 ("Behavioral research on household
responses to energy information suggests that a proposal to install smart meters that simply
provide feedback to household energy users might have yielded substantial use reductions ... ").
Many smart meter discussions to date are limited to load-shifting strategies such as critical-peak
pricing, however, and do not focus on communicating real-time information to customers about
electricity use and its carbon implications. See id. at 739, 739 n.97 (discussing the rejection of a
smart meter program in Maryland linked directly to demand peak pricing and the recognition
that the success of such initiatives depends on customer education and communication).
Research shows that the types of information that can be gathered and disclosed to the consumer
through smart meter programs can reduce electricity use by 5.5% to 14%. See EHRHARDTMARTINEZ ET AL., supra note 53, at 48 ("[Mledian household savings vary from 5.5% for programs
that employ enhanced billing strategies to 14% for those that provide real-time feedback
disaggregated by energy end use."). See generally Ahmad Faruqui & Jenny Palmer, The
Discovery of Price Responsiveness-A Survey of Experiments Involving Dynamic Pricing of
Electricity 1, 11 (Mar. 12, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract
=2020587 (surveying 126 pricing experiments with dynamic pricing and time-of-use pricing of
electricity to show that "the presence of enabling technology allows customers to increase their
peak reduction").
88. For example, Florida law requires the Florida Public Service Commission to contract
for an independent evaluation of the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act ("FEECA")
to determine if the Act remains in the public interest, including whether it is cost effective in
reducing peak demand and overall consumption. 2012 Fla. Laws 117.
89. See ARIMURA ET AL., supra note 57, at 23-24 (discussing previous studies that
overstated the benefits of DSM).
90.
See COLUMBIA LAW SCH., CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, PUBLIC UTILITIES
COMMISSIONS AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY: A HANDBOOK OF LEGAL AND REGULATORY TOOLS FOR
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B. Performance Standardsfor Demand Reduction
Another option for state regulators is to mandate that the
electric distribution utility reduce demand by specific amounts or that
it spend specific amounts on demand reduction activities. 91 Roughly
twenty states have mandated reductions in overall demand, including
Maryland and New York. 92 Many of these mandates emphasize
efficiency improvements, which can be realized in power supply
investments or at the customer level, but they also include efforts to
encourage conservation. The strength of these approaches is that they
provide clear, unequivocal direction to a utility that might otherwise
be tempted by volumetric rates to favor investing in large-scale base
load plants over reducing demand.
These approaches do not confront the underlying problem of
utility incentives, however, and thus are unlikely to lead to
widespread change. Under the mandated reductions approach,
utilities may comply with the mandate at the cost of pursuing other
desirable goals such as investment in renewable projects. Perhaps
most important, utilities may have incentives to lobby against large
mandated reductions and may lack incentives to exceed the mandates.
As a result, utilities cannot be expected to be subject to aggressive
targets or to exceed the targets that are set. Similarly, under the
mandated spending approach, to the extent the utility's revenues are
derived from its volume, it does not have an incentive to spend more
than the mandated amount or to spend the funds any more effectively
than necessary to satisfy regulatory oversight. In short, utilities lack
incentives for innovation and for exceeding minimum standards.
As a modest alternative, state policymakers might consider
merging demand reduction performance standards into other policy
tools to promote innovation in NDR at the state and local level. A
clean energy standard, such as that favored by the Obama
Administration, differs from a state renewable power standard
("RPS") in that it does not focus entirely on power supply but allows
efficiency and conservation to compete with energy supply options on a
one-to-one basis. Many states already allow conservation and
efficiency savings to qualify as a type of renewable energy for an RPS
or renewable energy credit purposes, although some of these states
COMMISSIONERS AND ADVOCATES 25-27 (2012) [hereinafter ENERGY EFFICIENCY HANDBOOK],

available at http://www.smartgridnews.com/artman/uploads/1/PUCHandbook-August_2012.pdf
(contrasting rate impact measures with other approaches to analyzing energy efficiency
programs, including the total resource cost test).
91. This approach is discussed in ENERGY EFFICIENCY HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 46-47.
92. See ARIMURA ET AL., supra note 57, at 2.
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discount the value of conservation and efficiency.9 3 If the goal is NDR,
there is no reason for discounting the value of conservation and
efficiency, given that these can be even more valuable than
investments in renewable projects. Indeed, such an approach could
have broader appeal than an RPS, and it may be attractive to some
additional state legislatures for the same reasons that an RPS
originally was-the promise of jobs and new technologies.
However, any benefits of these more modest approaches as
compared to a stand-alone NDR mandate would be limited. Even if
NDR is compared one to one with investments in renewable energy,
this will place NDR in direct competition with renewable investments,
which will undermine the ability to reduce overall fossil fuel use.
Perhaps there is a natural limit on the combination of NDR and
renewable energy that any jurisdiction will tolerate, but this seems
unlikely, at least in the near term. Moreover, since many renewable
resources also qualify for both state and local tax credits, and few
NDR initiatives enjoy such subsidies, unless these programs focus
heavily on explicit NDR goals they are likely to produce
underinvestment in NDR.
C. Revenue Decoupling and Shared Savings in Demand Reduction
Neither the social cost of carbon nor the performance mandate
approach acknowledges the principal issue of how the distribution
utilities sell power. Addressing how utilities sell power is the only
solution that simultaneously confronts how volumetric pricing has
contributed to utilities' strong preference for investments in base load
and to the preference among policymakers for low rates and
increasing use. This is also the only approach that has the prospect of
inducing levels of management attention, staffing, innovation, and
investment in demand reduction that are comparable to the utilities'
investments in increasing revenue under a volumetric -pricing regime.
"Revenue decoupling" initiatives separate a distribution utility's
revenues from its incentives to increase the amount of power it sells to
customers. 94 These decoupling programs may be the best way to
93. For a discussion on the need for a national RPS, see generally Lincoln L. Davies, Power
Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010). See also American
Clean Energy and Security Act, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 610(f)(1)(A) (2009) (calling for the
FERC to "specify the types of energy efficiency and energy conservation measures that can be
counted" when defining and measuring electricity savings).
94. The term "decoupling" is loaded with different meanings depending on the policy
context. In discussion about competition in electric power, "decoupling" might be taken to mean
the separation of distribution and generation. "Bundled" rates, reflecting the costs of generation,
transmission, and distribution are offered in many states (e.g., Tennessee and Florida). These
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ensure that utilities have ongoing incentives to develop, fund, and
implement highly effective efficiency and conservation measures.
Decoupling has been adopted, in varying forms and degrees, by
roughly twenty states, although many of these states have not adopted
decoupling in a form that is likely to create ongoing incentives for
NDR. 95 The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act also included
language that promoted but did not require state adoption of revenue
96
decoupling.
Revenue decoupling can be implemented through a variety of
policy instruments. 97 A common approach is a type of "decoupling lite"
that provides for lost revenue adjustments designed to compensate
utilities for lost revenue and presumably make them neutral between
lost sales and new investments. 98 These approaches remove
disincentives for NDR, but they do not create incentives to achieve
NDR. More proactive approaches to decoupling offer utilities
affirmative incentives for retail demand reduction. For example, some
regulators offer utilities incentives by rewarding them post sale for
NDR savings associated with conservation and efficiency. If a utility

differ from the unbundled prices customers are offered in states with retail choice (e.g., Texas),
where an electric distribution utility provides distribution lines and the meter, and it simply
passes through the cost of the power from generators. In these types of jurisdictions, in a sense
the distributor has been "decoupled" from the generator. We choose to call this unbundling, and
our emphasis is on a different kind of decoupling, what we call "revenue decoupling." For a
discussion on the different degrees of decoupling, see THE REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT,
REVENUE REGULATION AND DECOUPLING: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND APPLICATION 11-13 (2011).

For a recent analysis of decoupling in the economics literature, see TIMOTHY J. BRENNAN &
KAREN PALMER, RES. FOR THE FUTURE, ENERGY EFFICIENCY RESOURCE STANDARDS: ECONOMICS

AND POLICY (2011), available at http://www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-12-10.pdf.
ENERGY
SOLUTIONS,
95. See Decoupling Policies, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND
http://www.c2es.orglsites/defaultlmodules/usmap/pdf.php?file=7016 (last updated July 5, 2012)
(identifying the states that have adopted decoupling measures); see also Decoupling in Detail,
CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what-s_eingdone
/in the states/decoupling-detail (last visited Sept. 6, 2012) (explaining the general issues of
revenue decoupling in energy markets using electricity-specific examples). For a recent article
that is skeptical of decoupling approaches, see Brian S. Tomasovic, Revenue Decoupling for
Electricity Distributors:Current Approaches and Future Outlook, 6 TEX. J. OIL, GAS, & ENERGY
L. 176, 180-82 (2010.2011). See also Shannon Baker-Branstetter, Distributed Renewable
Generation:The Trifecta of Energy Solutions to Curb Carbon Emissions, Reduce Pollutants, and
Empower Ratepayers, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 19 n.113 (2011); Davies, supra note 93, at 1356.
Both show a lack of enthusiasm for the effects of decoupling measures.
96. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 410, 123 Stat. 115, 147
(2009); see also Tomasovic, supra note 95, at 177 (noting that the final version of the bill softened
any pressure on states to "adopt or experiment with decoupling measures" in order to receive
$3.1 billion in state grants).
97. For further discussion of revenue decoupling, see ENERGY EFFICIENCY HANDBOOK,
supra note 90, at 31-35.
98. Id. at 33 (noting that this approach has been critiqued for failing to remove utility
incentives to invest in supply-side resources and being subject to strategic gaming by utilities).
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meets some annual NDR target, regulators might provide that firm a
more beneficial rate of return in approving its rates. Or if the utility
fails to meet an annual NDR target, regulators might penalize the
firm by reducing its rate of return. This approach directly incentivizes
the firm to focus on NDR in its business decisions. 99
Another approach, akin to the social cost approach discussed
above, is to build the benefits from NDR more directly into the pricing
of electricity by directly decoupling revenue from sales prior to the
point of sale. For example, firms could explicitly propose to produce
"negawatts" (basically, a reduction in capacity corresponding to a
decrease in demand) and could be compensated for the costs of the
negawatts in the same way they are compensated for building a new
power plant or expanding the plant's operation. The costs might
include the opportunity cost of lost sales, since the firm might suffer
some short-term financial losses due to demand reduction. The basic
point is that if negawatt investments are built into a utility's rate
base, competing side by side with alternatives such as building a new
power plant, this will challenge the firm to consider NDR along with
base load power options in its business decisions.
Whatever policy instrument is chosen as a vehicle for
implementing it, revenue decoupling rejects the conventional
emphasis on volumetric rates. Decoupling also has important
implications for changing firm behavior and consumer perceptions;
when revenue is decoupled from sales, it can be recoupled to some
other goal, such as improved efficiency or the climate change benefits
from NDR. With decoupling, firms are less likely to focus on investing
in base load power plants and allocating these costs among customers,
a cycle that volumetric rates reinforce. For electric distribution
utilities, building new base load capacity would no longer be seen as
the only guaranteed revenue source. Investing in conservation and
efficiency programs would now be seen as equally significant to the
bottom line of the firm.
With revenue decoupling, customers also are less likely to focus
on low rates, especially if firms offer incentives to reduce energy usage
in order to share in the rewards of NDR. This can be viewed as a type
of "decoupling-plus."' 10 0 Shared savings programs such as the
decoupling-plus approach adopted in California have analogues in

99. For an example based on an experience in Idaho, see Ralph Cavanagh, Graphs, Words,
and Deeds: Reflections on Commissioner Rosenfeld and California's Energy Efficiency
Leadership, INNOVATIONS, Fall 2009, at App. (paid subscription required).
100. See Sachs, supra note 8, at 316 (discussing California's efforts to supplement
decoupling and characterizing this effort as a type of shared savings).

2012]

GOOD FOR YOU, BAD FOR US

1561

health care regulation and can take many forms. 1 1 For example, a
decoupling approach might invite nonutility energy services firms to
sell demand reduction or efficiency directly to consumers (e.g., Energy
Service Companies or "ESCOs" at the industrial, small business, and
household scales). Large industrial and commercial customers have
achieved substantial savings from the use of ESCOs. A collective
action problem, however, discourages the spread of the ESCO
approach to small businesses and residential customers. Once the
savings are aggregated, they may be large enough to make it
attractive to invest in the services they provide, which again
highlights the significance of the utility's selling power.
Revenue decoupling has strengths and weaknesses in terms of
political viability and policy implications. Many details need to be
resolved, including how incentives are allocated between utilities and
customers and who will pay for NDR. Still, revenue decoupling
ultimately merits serious consideration alongside both social cost and
performance standard approaches to demand reduction. It also has
advantages over alternative approaches. One advantage is that it is
the only option that directly confronts both the low-rate approach of
volumetric pricing and the reliability approach that favors
investments in base load plants by utilities. Revenue decoupling

101. Health care regulators confront a comparable problem: how to create incentives for
hospitals and doctors to sell less of their product-health care. They have turned to the shared
savings model as well. For example, the Accountable Care Organization Demonstration Project
("ACO"), established by the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is a new Medicare
program designed to achieve quality and savings improvements in healthcare by efficiently
coordinating primary care doctors, specialists, hospitals, and other providers. News Release,
Dep't of Health and Human Servs., HHS Announces New Incentives for Providers to Work
Together Through Accountable Care Organizations When Caring for People with Medicare (Oct.
The
20, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/10/20111020a.html.
coordinating providers are encouraged to participate in the program through a shared savings
model. See Mark McClellan et al., A National Strategy to Put Accountable Care into Practice,29
HEALTH AFF. 982, 983-84 (2010), available at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content
/29/5/982.abstract (noting that the ACO model builds on similar shared savings initiatives that
Medicare has implemented in the past several years). The Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act states that "the Secretary shall establish a shared savings program ... that promotes
accountability for a patient population and coordinates items and services . . . and encourages
investment in infrastructure and redesigned care processes for high quality and efficient service
delivery." 42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(a)(1) (2011). Eligible providers may opt into the ACO program but
they must "be willing to become accountable for the quality, cost, and overall care of the
Medicare fee-for-service beneficiaries assigned to it." Id. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(A). Under the ACO
program, the Secretary sets savings benchmarks based on "average per capita Medicare
expenditures . . . adjusted for beneficiary characteristics" and also sets "quality performance
standards to assess the quality of care furnished by ACOs." Id. § 1395jjj(b)(3)(c)-(d)(1)(b).
However, "ACOs will only share in savings if they meet both the quality performance standards
and generate shareable savings." 76 Fed. Reg. 67,801, 67,804 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42
C.F.R. pt. 425).
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provides an opportunity to address incentives for some customers and
to allow them to share in the savings. Decoupling also may be the only
option that is likely to overcome utilities' emphasis on volumetric
rates and on investment in base load plants, as well as the emphasis
among PUCs on low consumer rates, as opposed to low total consumer
expenditures.
IV. CONCLUSION

For many decades, the goal of efficient provision of supply
based on an assumption of continued demand growth was considered
sacrosanct in utility regulation. An emerging new approach focuses on
reducing externalities from supply, challenging the longstanding
assumption of demand growth on which many regulatory solutions
have been built. 10 2 Assumed growth in demand limits how firms and
regulators see their options in approaching low-carbon sources of
supply.
A full transformation in the scholarship and the industry may
not occur until a new generation of scholars and decisionmakers are in
place who view the electricity regulatory goal not simply as a matter
of efficient supply, with efficiency narrowly defined to exclude
consideration of effects that are not priced, such as carbon emissions.
But initial movement is underway. In recent years, a growing
literature has examined how a combination of legal, economic, and
social influences can reduce the growth in energy demand. 10 3 This
literature suggests that the demand side of the equation is as
important as the supply side, but this literature has focused largely on
the incentives of households and other consumers, not on the
incentives of utilities, the key gatekeepers for demand reduction.
Our logic is simple. The scientific consensus is that
catastrophic climate change poses a genuine threat and that
substantial reductions in global carbon emissions are necessary over
the next several decades. Energy supply accounts for by far the largest
source of carbon emissions. Energy experts project that global energy
demand will double by 2050 if we follow the business-as-usual path.

102. This is occurring with water supply and demand as well. See Gleick, supra note 37, at
1525-26 (discussing a new approach to water services that shifts focus away from decades of
inconsistent demand projections to one that relies on the users' needs).
103. See generally Dernbach, supra note 8, at 10003 (evaluating a range of legal and policy
tools to promote greater efficiency and conservation of energy in the United States);
Vandenbergh & Steinemann, supra note 8, at 1674-75 (relying on norms theory and empirical
studies to propose legal reforms for reducing individual contributions to greenhouse gas
emissions).
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Energy experts also suggest that major carbon emissions reductions
are possible from a variety of low-carbon and non-carbon-emitting
sources, but that it is unrealistic to assume that these sources will be
able to displace existing fossil fuel sources and keep up with the
anticipated growth in energy demand. Some miraculous technological
fix could solve this problem, but energy experts are doubtful that this
will occur. The physics of energy and the scope of the energy
infrastructure are such that a single miraculous breakthrough or
group of breakthroughs is unlikely to occur and to be deployed at the
scale and in the time necessary.104
Something has to give. Countries will either miss their carbon
emissions targets (and hope the consensus targets were too
conservative), or they will need to invest in reducing demand as well
as increasing the supply of low-carbon energy sources. For the most
part, the United States has focused on the supply side. Regulators and
firms have made some investments in low-carbon energy supply and
have taken occasional steps to reduce demand, but they have not
treated demand reduction as a priority at the federal level or in many
states and localities.
We argue not only that legal and policy interventions can affect
demand growth, but also that policymakers should recognize the
important gatekeeping role that utilities play for the uptake of various
efficiency and conservation measures. Electricity distributors alone
probably cannot induce households to achieve an adequate level of
NDR, but they are an essential intermediary. Yet in most U.S.
jurisdictions, electricity distributors lack the financial incentives to
achieve widespread success with NDR programs. Instead, the
regulatory structure induces these utilities to view NDR as revenue
erosion. Programs that provide financial or social incentives for
households to reduce demand will not achieve their potential if
electricity distributors do not consistently face incentives to sell less
electricity--or at least no longer face incentives to sell more electricity
to finance their base load plant investments.
Many law and policy options are available for shifting utilities'
incentives to induce reduced household energy demand. We do not
believe the choice of a specific regulatory intervention is as important
as the conceptual shift toward recognizing the need to treat NDR as
an important goal and to provide ongoing incentives for utilities to
pursue NDR with gusto. Once regulators and firms begin to make the
conceptual shift, the policy debate is more likely to yield productive
104. See, e.g., Nathan Lewis, Toward Cost-Effective Solar Energy Use, 315 SCIENCE 798,
798-801 (2007) (discussing the challenges facing the widespread implementation of solar energy).
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regulatory changes. To the extent regulatory changes are possible,
some mix of shared savings and other approaches may create
sufficient incentives for utilities to view demand reduction not as
"good for you, bad for us," but as "good for you, good for us."

